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Abstract
This paper uses a dynamic panel estimation method to investigate the determi-
nants of regional specialization in China’s industries, paying particular attention
to local protectionism. Less geographic concentration is found in industries where
the past tax-plus-proﬁt margins and the shares of state ownership are high, re-
ﬂecting stronger local government protection of these industries. The evidence
also supports the scale-economies theory of regional specialization. Finally, the
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the later years.
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Trade facilitates specialization, which in turn leads to more gains from trade. To un-
derstand the pattern of trade among geographic units, one needs to investigate the
determinants of international/regional specialization. For this reason, the study of ge-
ographic concentration in production has been an important area of research in both
international and regional economics. Much of the empirical literature on this topic,
however, is carried out using sub-national data, and hence focusing on the regional
specialization of economic activities (see Hanson (2001), and Overman, Redding, and
Venables (2001) for most recent surveys). Such an approach has two advantages. One
is that comparable data is more readily available for sub-national units and the other
is that it avoids the diﬃculty of controlling institutional diﬀerences across countries in
international studies (Davis, Weinstein, Bradford and Shimpo (1997), Bacchetta, Rose,
and van Wincoop (2001), and O’Connell and Wei (2002)).
A number of theories have been proposed to account for international/regional spe-
cialization of economic activities. One theory emphasizes the disparity in resource en-
dowments across geographic units (Ohlin, 1933). Second, for industries that enjoy in-
creasing returns to scale, there is a natural tendency to have production clustered in a
few places as opposed to scattered in many places (Krugman, 1991). Third, even for
industries that exhibit constant or decreasing returns to scale, it is possible that a ﬁrm’s
cost of production (or its ability to introduce new products and services) is reduced (or
enhanced) by the presence in the same region of other ﬁrms in the same industry. Such
spillover eﬀects or external economies could then lead to the geographic concentration
of production (Marshall, 1920).
While the beneﬁts of trade and specialization are well understood, a pre-condition
for realizing these beneﬁts – namely, free ﬂow of goods and services across regions and
countries – is not always satisﬁed due to possible protectionism at both international
and sub-national levels. Protectionism creates barriers to trade, making trade more diﬃ-
cult and specialization less beneﬁcial. Therefore, protectionism should have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the degree of specialization.
The relationship between protectionism and specialization, however, has not received
its deserved attention in the existing literature. As far as we know, there exists no
1systematic study, especially empirical study, of the relationship in the literature. The
lack of study on this issue in the international context is probably due to the data
problem discussed earlier, whereas the deﬁciency of sub-national studies on the issue is
partly because in many countries, such as the United States, interregional trade barriers
are prohibited by the national government and therefore local protectionism is not a
factor. The case of China is diﬀerent and it provides us with a unique opportunity to
study the role of local protectionism in regional specialization. China’s economic reform
since 1978 has introduced ﬁscal decentralization, which provided the local governments
with a strong incentive to protect their tax base by shielding local ﬁrms and industries
from interregional competition. The local governments also have incentives to protect
state-owned enterprises under their administration, which are their base of political
power, their source of private beneﬁts as well as ﬁscal revenue. Meanwhile, there was no
promulgation in the early years of economic reform, and no eﬀective implementation in
the later years, of central-government policies that prohibit interregional trade barriers.
Therefore, local protectionism is an important factor in China’s regional specialization.
There is considerable controversy about the degree of local protectionism in China.
Young (2000) provides anecdotal evidence on the rise of local protectionism in China
during the reform era especially in the 1980s. He also presents statistical evidence of
declining regional specialization based on the evolution of the ﬁve sectors in the socialist
measure of national income (agriculture, industry, construction, transport, and com-
merce) and on the evolution of the three sectors in GDP accounting (primary, secondary,
and tertiary). Naughton (1999), on the other hand, uses data from the input—output
tables among Chinese provinces in 1992, and ﬁnds evidence consistent with increasing
regional specialization between 1987 and 1992. A systematic study on local protection-
ism as a determinant of regional specialization and a further investigation on the time
t r e n do fr e g i o n a ls p e c i a l i z a t i o ni nC h i n aw o u l ds h e du s e f u ll i g h to nt h i sc o n t r o v e r s y .
We construct a panel data set of 32 two-digit industries in 29 Chinese regions1 over
the period of 13 years between 1985 and 1997. Our data on regional specialization are
more disaggregated than those used by Young (2000), and cover a longer and more
1The sample includes 29 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the cen-
tral government. Hanan gained the status of a province in 1988. However, its data are included in
Guangdong province in this study.
2recent time period than those used by Naughton (1999). Using the data, we study not
only the overall time trend but also the determinants of regional specialization. We
pay particular attention to the role of local protectionism, in addition to the traditional
theories of regional specialization. Speciﬁcally, it is conjectured that local governments
tend to protect industries that yielded high proﬁt and tax in the past, thereby reducing
the geographic concentration in those industries. Local protectionism is also expected
to be signiﬁcant for industries with large shares of state ownership.
Because the relocation of industrial activities is a slow process, their distribution
across regions should be strongly inﬂuenced by its historical pattern as well as the factors
that we just discussed. To accommodate this consideration, we estimate a dynamic panel
structure in which the lagged values of the dependent variable, namely, the degree of
regional specialization, appear on the right hand side of the equation together with other
explanatory variables. A procedure developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is used for
the estimation.
Our empirical ﬁndings generally support our hypotheses about local protectionism.
Other things being equal, regional specialization is found to be low for industries that
y i e l d e dh i g hp r o ﬁt and tax in the past, and for industries with large shares of state
ownership. Our study also lends strong support to the scale-economies theory and
weak support to the external-economies theory of regional specialization. Because we
cannot ﬁnd a satisfactory measure of the degree of reliance on immobile resources of the
industries, we do not test the resource-endowment theory. Finally, the overall time trend
of China’s regional specialization of industrial production has reversed an early drop in
the mid 1980s, and registered a signiﬁcant increase in the later years. This ﬁnding
contributes to the settling of the debate over the time trend of local protectionism in
China.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
theories of regional specialization in more detail and develop hypotheses based on them.
In Section 3, we construct some variables for the testing of various hypotheses. De-
scriptive statistics of key variables are oﬀered and compared with some of the ﬁndings
in the existing literature. Section 4 presents econometric testing of the hypotheses and
assesses the relevance of various theories in the context of China. The paper concludes
with Section 5.
32 Theories and Hypotheses
Regional specialization of industrial production within a country shares many common
features with international specialization and has received considerable attention in the
study of international trade and regional economics.
The ﬁrst theory of regional specialization is a natural extension of the resource-
endowment theory of international specialization (Ohlin, 1933). Diﬀerent regions are
endowed with diﬀerent sets of natural, physical, and human resources. When trade
among diﬀerent regions is possible, each region specializes in producing a subset of
goods and services. The pattern of specialization is determined by the comparative
advantages of regions implied jointly by resource endowments and technological capabil-
ities. However, it is important to note that this theory is based on a crucial assumption
that factors of production are immobile. To summarize the above discussion, we have:
Hypothesis 1: Industries with heavy employment of immobile resources are geographically
concentrated.
The second theory of regional specialization comes from the scale-economies theory
of international trade (Krugman, 1991). In an industry where there is a signiﬁcant ﬁxed
cost of production or a decreasing average variable cost of production, a ﬁrm would enjoy
a low average cost of production by producing a large volume of goods and services, which
in turn enhances the ﬁrm’s competitiveness and increases the demand for its products.
The positive feedback eventually leads to a high concentration of production. Hence we
have:
Hypothesis 2: Geographic concentration is more likely in industries that exhibit increasing
returns to scale.
The third theory of regional specialization is that of external economies (Marshall,
1920). There are three main channels through which the presence in the same region
of other ﬁrms in the same industry may exert positive spillover eﬀects: a cluster of
an industry attracts specialized suppliers, it allows labor-market pooling, and it helps
foster knowledge spillover (Enright, 1990; Krugman and Obstfeld, 2000). The ﬁrst two
channels imply that a ﬁrm’s cost of production is reduced by being among a cluster
4of other ﬁrms in the same industry, whereas the third channel suggests that a ﬁrm is
more likely to develop new products and services by being among the cluster. Under
each of the three channels, a positive feedback arises, which eventually leads to regional
specialization of industrial production. For empirical tests of the theory, please see
inﬂuential studies by Rauch (1993), Dumais, Ellision, and Glaeser (1997), and Rosenthal
and Stranger (2001). We summarize the above discussion with the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: The degree of regional specialization is higher for industries that enjoy
signiﬁcant external economies.
Underlying each of the above three traditional theories of regional specialization is
the assumption of free ﬂow of goods and services across regions. If each region were an
isolated island, then there would not be any specialization in industrial production across
the regions, even if there were scale economies, or external economies, or signiﬁcant
disparity in resource endowment. In general, there is interregional trade in goods and
services, the ease of which, however, depends on the severity of local protectionism,
among other factors. Therefore, the degree of regional specialization depends on the
extent of local protectionism.
It should be pointed out that local governments in almost every country, whether it
is economically developed or still developing, have the incentive to protect their local in-
dustries. This is because local governments rely on their local industries for tax revenue.
In addition, local industries, when proﬁtable, oﬀer stable employment opportunity for
the local people, which is crucial in elections in economically developed economies and
for social stability in transition economies (Bai, Li, Tao, and Wang, 2000). To ensure
a solid tax base and maintain employment, local governments can erect various barri-
ers of trade to protect local industries from interregional competition. This problem is
similar to the protectionism in international trade. Compared with international trade
among countries, however, it should be easier to ensure smooth interregional trade as
the national government does have authority over local governments. Indeed, in the
United States, the constitution prohibits interstate tariﬀs. This has greatly facilitated
interregional trade of goods and services and led to regional specialization of industrial
production.
During China’s economic transition in the past two decades, anecdotal evidence
5suggests that there is substantial ﬂow of goods and services across regions, though local
protectionism has been from time to time a serious problem. The main force behind
local protectionism arises from some mismatch in the economic policies during the reform
era. Prior to the economic reform in 1978, China had a highly centralized ﬁscal system.
All the tax revenue collected had to go ﬁrst to the central government. The planning
commission of the central government had the authority to decide the expenditure of
the local governments and allocate revenue from the central pool (Qian, 2000). Such
a system delinked tax revenue and expenditure at the level of local governments, and
provided little incentive for local protection or even local production. Since 1978, ﬁscal
decentralization has been introduced, which allows the local governments to retain a
percentage of the revenue collected and therefore provides them with a strong incentive
to protect local industries. What is lacking in the ﬁscal reform is the promulgation in
the early years and eﬀective implementation in the later years of a policy that prohibits
barriers to interregional trade.
It is diﬃcult to directly measure the extent of local protectionism in China. Pro-
tection is not carried out by imposing tariﬀs or setting quota on inter-regional trade,
rather by administrative decrees that are designed ostensibly for other purposes. For
example, the Shanghai government protected the local automobile industry by adopting
environmental regulations that were tailored to the technical speciﬁcations of locally
produced passenger cars, eﬀectively shutting out cars produced in other regions. These
means of protection are idiosyncratic in nature and it is diﬃcult to develop a measure
of them that can be applied to all industries.
To develop testable hypotheses regarding local protectionism, we take an indirect
approach by looking into the beneﬁts that the local governments can derive from pro-
tecting local industries from interregional competition and inferring which industries the
local governments would like to protect. First of all, as pointed out earlier, the local
governments rely on local industries for tax revenue. It is thus conjectured that the local
governments want to protect industries that have high tax margins. For state-owned
enterprises, which remain signiﬁcant in China despite two decades of economic reform,
the local governments care about their proﬁts as well. Furthermore, due to the lack of
rule of law, even proﬁts of privately owned enterprises are subject to some degrees of
expropriation, in the form of ad hoc taxes and fees, by the local governments. We thus
6summarize our above discussion with the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: Geographic concentration is low for those industries that had high tax-
plus-proﬁt margins in the past.
Note that it takes time for the local governments to learn which industries have
high tax-plus-proﬁt margins, and hence the use of lagged tax-plus-proﬁtm a r g i n si nt h e
above hypothesis. It should be emphasized that, though the local governments also care
about the employment created by the local industries, their pursuit for the tax-plus-
proﬁt margins is overriding. This is because supporting money-losing industries just for
the sake of maintaining local employment is not sustainable. It is only when the local
industries are proﬁtable, then the created employment is stable, consequently providing
long-lasting beneﬁts to the local governments. Increasing evidence suggests that local
governments in China are anxious to get rid of money-losing enterprises so that they
do not have to deal with the eventual loss of employment from these enterprises (Kung,
1999). We therefore subsume the local governments’ beneﬁts from local employment in
the hypothesis on the tax-plus-proﬁtm a r g i n s .
Next, it is an undeniable fact that the local governments in China derive much
more beneﬁts from the state-owned enterprises than from other types of enterprises. As
the local governments/oﬃcials hold the right to appoint the chief executives of state-
owned enterprises, they have many more ways of milking the state-owned enterprises as
compared with other enterprises. For example, local government oﬃcials can arrange
employment for their relatives, friends, and political supporters in the state-owned enter-
prises. Local governments can also divert money from the state-owned enterprises, even
publicly listed ones, to public works at best and personal uses at worst. Advertising and
sponsorship by state-owned enterprises in government-led activities are considered polit-
ically correct and actively encouraged. Given the special beneﬁts from the state-owned
enterprises, the local governments have stronger incentive to protect them. Therefore,
we have:
Hypothesis 5: Regional specialization is low for industries with high shares of state
ownership.
73 Data and Measurement
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss how to construct a measure of regional specialization of
industrial production. Then we deﬁne and measure other variables that will be used
for testing the hypotheses discussed in the previous section. Finally, we present some
summary statistics. In particular, we discuss the time trend of regional specialization in
China, and comment on the related work by Naughton (1999) and Young (2000).
3.1 A measure of regional specialization
One way to measure regional specialization is to quantify the interregional trade patterns
resulting from specialization. This approach is widely adopted for studying division of
labor and specialization in the global economy. Compared with trade among diﬀerent
countries, however, data on interregional trade within a country are diﬃcult to come
by. Hence, in this paper, we take a more direct approach to measuring the degree of
regional specialization: namely, mapping out the geographic distribution of production
activities in each industry and normalizing it by that of overall production activities.
Output data of 32 industries in 29 Chinese regions are obtained from: the China
Statistical Yearbook for 1985—1987, the China Statistical Yearbook on Industrial Economy
for 1988—1994 and 1997, the China Industrial Census for 1995, and the China Statistics
Bureau for 1996.2 With the output data, we then construct a measure of regional
specialization called Hoover coeﬃcient of localization (1936). It is based on the location
quotient with respect to output, which is deﬁned as
Lij =
OUTPUTij
OUTPUTi
Á
OUTPUTj
OUTPUT
where OUTPUTij is output of industry i in region j, OUTPUTj is total output in region
2While the data are obtained from diﬀerent statistical yearbooks, they are all compiled by the same
China Statistics Bureau and are supposed to follow a common set of statistical criteria. In general, the
most detailed industry-by-region data are provided by the China Statistical Yearbook in the early years,
but by the China Statistical Yearbook on Industrial Economy in the later years. For 1995 and 1996,
there was no publication of the China Statistical Yearbook on Industrial Economy, the reason being the
publication of the China Industrial Census of 1995 (private communications with oﬃcials at the China
Statistics Bureau). The data for 1995 are thus from the China Industrial Census, while those for 1996
are kindly provided by the China Statistics Bureau. For a summary of data sources, please refer to the
Data Appendix.
8j, OUTPUTi is total output of industry i,a n dOUTPUT is total industrial output of
China.3 If Lij is larger than one, then region j has a higher percentage of industry i than
of total industrial output. Similarly, if Lij is smaller than one, then region j has a lower
percentage of industry i than of total industrial output. Given the location quotients
of industry i for all regions j =1 ,...,R, we rank regions by their location quotients
in descending order and get a sequence of regions. Then, following that sequence, we
calculate the cumulative percentage of output in industry i over the regions (y-axis)
and the cumulative percentage of output in all industries over the regions (x-axis), and
thus plot the localization curve for industry i. If the industry is evenly distributed across
regions, then the location quotient will be equal to one for all regions, and the localization
curve will be the 45-degree line. If the industry is more regionally concentrated, then
the localization curve will be more concave. Analogous to the Gini coeﬃcient for income
distribution, the Hoover coeﬃcient of localization (henceforth denoted by HOOVER)
is deﬁned as the area between the 45-degree line and the localization curve divided by
the entire triangular area in which the localization curve is contained. Thus the Hoover
coeﬃcient is between 0 and 1, and the higher its value the more localized is the industry.
A Hoover coeﬃcient of localization can also be constructed from the employment
data. In fact, this approach is used in a number of studies on the regional specialization of
economic activities in the United States (Kim, 1995; Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Dumais,
Ellison, and Glaeser, 1997). In this paper, we construct a Hoover coeﬃcient using output
data instead of employment data, for two reasons. First, there are fewer employment
data than output data. Employment data of 32 industries in 29 Chinese regions can be
obtained from China Industrial Census for 1985, from the China Statistical Yearbook on
Industrial Economy for 1988-1994 and 1997, and from China Statistics Bureau for 1996.
The employment data for other years are disaggregated only to the level of industry,
not the level of industry by region, which makes it impossible to calculate the Hoover
coeﬃcient. The lack of employment data for three (i.e., 1986, 1987 and 1995) out of the
thirteen years would pose signiﬁcant challenges when dynamic panel data estimation
3When constructing the Hoover coeﬃcient of localization, we generally use output values in current
prices. Unfortunately, for 1985 and 1986, output values in current prices are not available; instead their
values in 1980 constant prices are used. This may cause discrepancy in calculating the numerator of
the location quotient. But we believe the discrepancy to be small, as the prices of various products in
t h es a m ei n d u s t r i e sa r ee x p e c t e dt om o v ec l o s e l yt o g e t h e r .
9procedures (e.g., the Arellano-Bond procedure) are used in the econometric analysis.
Second, employment data may suﬀer from the surplus labor problem that is particularly
prevalent in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As the extent of the surplus labor problem
varies across regions and industries, the Hoover coeﬃcient obtained through employment
data will be biased. Indeed, we ﬁnd that, while the overall correlation between the
Hoover coeﬃcient calculated using output data and that using employment data is more
than 95%, it is decreasing slowly and consistently over time, from 96.89% in 1988 to
92.39% in 1997, which indicates increasing surplus labor problem in SOEs and growing
biases of the Hoover coeﬃcient calculated from the employment data.
An alternative measure of localization is developed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997).
Their index controls for diﬀerences in the size distribution of plants by factoring in
the Herﬁndah index of the concerned industry. Since we do not have data on China’s
industries that allow us to compute or estimate the Herﬁndah indices for the industries
in the sample period, we do not use the Ellison-Glaeser index, and will control for the
scale diﬀerence among the industries by including the average ﬁrm size of an industry
as an explanatory variable for the degree of localization. Recall Hypothesis 2 and see
Section 3.2.B for details.
3.2 Other variables
Next we turn to the challenge of ﬁnding variables for testing the hypotheses discussed
in Section 2.
A. Resources
A crucial assumption for the resource-endowment theory of regional specialization is
that certain resources are immobile or their transportation costs are exceedingly high.
To test the hypothesis that resource-based industries tend to be localized, we therefore
need to ﬁnd an appropriate measure of those immobile resources.
In a study on regional specialization in the United States, Kim (1995) uses the cost
of raw materials divided by total value added as the measure of resource intensity. Note
that the measure is a ratio of the value of all material inputs to the industry’s total
value added. However, not all inputs are equally immobile; thus the measure used by
Kim may not reﬂect the industry’s true dependence on immobile resources. To illustrate
10this point, consider China’s electronics industry, which is dominated by low-value-added
OEMs using expensive inputs such as embedded chips. According to Kim’s measure, the
resource dependence rate is very high, but the inputs involved, such as the embedded
chips, are highly mobile. Furthermore, for the case of China, there is another drawback
with Kim’s measure, namely, the raw materials are often under government price control
and therefore the measure of resource intensity could be signiﬁcantly undervalued. Take
for example China’s tobacco industry. The prices for the raw materials are kept low due
to the government policy of supporting industrial development at the expense of rural
development (the price scissors phenomenon studied by Sah and Stiglitz, 1984). Thus
Kim’s measure of resource intensity would be low for China’s tobacco industry, though
the actual degree of resource dependence is very high.
To demonstrate the potential problems with the use of Kim’s measure for China,
we compute the raw-material intensity, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between output and
value added divided by value added, for the year 1992. As shown in Table 1, highly
resource-based industries such as coal mining & processing, ferrous & nonferrous metals
mining & processing, nonmetal minerals mining & processing, petroleum & natural gas
extraction, and tobacco processing have low values of Kim’s measure. In contrast, less
resource-based industries such as food processing & production, garments & other ﬁber
products, and textile have high values of Kim’s measure. We conclude that this measure
is not appropriate for Chinese industries.
One alternative measure for an industry’s dependence on resources is the energy con-
sumption intensity, which is deﬁned as the ratio of total energy consumption to total
output. The rationale for this measure is based on the observation that coal is the most
important energy source for industries in China, and freight transportation of coal in
China has been expensive.4 However, this measure is not without its own problems,
because more diverse energy sources are used in more recent years and some new energy
sources are more mobile than coal. In addition, there has been signiﬁcant eﬃciency
improvement in energy consumption, which implies the decreasing importance of energy
resources in the overall resource endowments. On balance, we still believe that energy
consumption intensity is a more appropriate measurement for an industry’s dependence
on immobile resources than the measure used by Kim (1995). Unfortunately, except for
4Similar measures have been used in Rosenthal and Stranger (2001).
11the year of 1995, industry-level data on energy consumption are based on various non-
standard industry classiﬁcation systems which are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the one
our data are based on. Given that dynamic panel data estimation methods will be em-
ployed to test the various hypotheses of regional specialization, the lack of usable energy
consumption data for all but one year prevents us from testing the speciﬁc hypothesis
on resource-endowment theory of regional specialization. This sacriﬁce is, however, jus-
tiﬁable, as the focus of this paper is to examine the impact of local protectionism on
regional specialization.5 We will discuss the potential missing variable bias in Section 4.
B. Scale economies
To test the hypothesis that industries characterized by increasing returns to scale
should be geographically concentrated, we use average ﬁrm size in an industry as a mea-
sure of scale economies. To be consistent with our measure of geographic concentration,
w eu s eo u t p u td a t at oc a l c u l a t et h ea v e r a g eﬁrm size. Data on output and number of
ﬁrms at the industry level are obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook on Industrial
Economy for 1985—1994 and 1996—1997, and from the China Industrial Census for 1995.6
Ap r i c ed e ﬂator7 for industrial output is constructed and used to obtain the output value
in constant terms. A panel data set of the average ﬁrm size in an industry, deﬁned as
the total output in an industry divided by the total number of ﬁrms in the industry and
denoted by SCALE, are readily constructed across 32 industries for 1985—1997.
C. External economies
External economies, through enhanced supply of specialized inputs, labor-market
pooling and knowledge spillover, are generally diﬃcult to measure directly. In this
5The resource-endowment theory of regional specialization has been extensively investigated in the
existing literature. In their study on the geographic concentration in the U.S. industries, Dumais, Ellison
and Glaeser (1997) use more recent and disaggregated data than Kim (1995) and ﬁnd signiﬁcant shifts in
industrial activity across regions, which suggests increasing irrelevance of the resource-endowment the-
ory. Presumably, as transportation becomes less costly, the key assumption for the resource-endowment
theory – immobile resources – may no longer hold in both developed and developing economies.
6Though the China Statistical Yearbook provides the most updated industry-by-region data for the
early years of the sample as stated in footnote 2, the 1993 China Statistical Yearbook on Industrial
Economy gives the historical data on industry-level output and number of ﬁrms, which are suitable for
constructing the variable of average ﬁrm size and are subsequently used due to their consistency.
7The price deﬂator for year t is calculated as IND_curt ÷ (IND_cur1978 × INDEXt),w h e r e
IND_curt denotes gross domestic industrial product in current price for year t,a n dINDEXt is the
index of gross domestic industrial product for year t in comparable prices (1978 = 100). For consistency,
all data needed for calculating the price deﬂator for the period of 1985-1997 are from the China Statistical
Yearbook.
12study, we use the share of engineers and technicians in an industry’s employment as a
proxy for the external economies. We believe that this variable oﬀers proxy for both
labor market pooling and knowledge spillover, following the arguments and analyses in
Dumais, Ellison, Glaeser (1997) and Rosenthal Stranger (2001).8 Data on the number of
engineers and technicians and total employment, both in large and medium enterprises,
are obtained for the 32 industries from the China Industrial Census for 1985, from
the China Statistics Bureau for 1987-1989, and from the China Statistical Yearbook
on Science and Technology for 1990-1997. A panel data set of the share of engineers
and technicians in an industry’s employment, deﬁned as the number of engineers and
technicians divided by the total employment and denoted by ET, are readily constructed
across 32 industries for 1985—1997.9
D. Tax-plus-proﬁtm a r g i n
Prior to the economic reform in 1978, most ﬁrms were state owned and both their
proﬁts and tax payments were counted as government revenue. In fact, the oﬃcial
statistics only reported tax plus proﬁt as a combined item and did not report their
separate ﬁgures for the early years in our sample period. Data on tax plus proﬁt and
sales for the 32 industries are obtained from the China Industrial Census for 1995, and
the China Statistical Yearbook on Industrial Economy for 1985—1994 and 1996—1997. A
panel data set of the tax-plus-proﬁt margin, deﬁned as tax plus proﬁt divided by sales
and denoted by TPM, is constructed across the 32 industries and for the period of
1985—1997.
8Dumais, Ellison, Glaeser (1997) use ﬁrm-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal
Research Database to construct proxies for the three channels of external economies of regional spe-
cilization, while Rosenthal and Stranger (2001) rely extensively on the data from the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis. In our study on regional specilization of industrial activities in China, however,
we are severely constrainted by data availability. For most of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
data, there are simply no counterparts in China’s economic statistics. Furthermore, the China Statistics
Bureau makes its census data available only at the industry level. We therefore focus on the variable of
the share of engineers and technicians, which is similar to the percentage of workers with Doctorates,
Master’s degrees and Bachelor’s degrees used in Rosenthal and Stranger to proxy for labor market
pooling, and also similar to the percentage of the employment with the college degree used by Dumais,
Ellison and Glaeser (1997) as an interaction variable for several proxies of knowledge spillover.
9While entering data from the China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology, we noticed
there was a signiﬁcant change in the terminology of various statistical variables therein for the year of
1993, whereas the data both before and after 1993 followed the same terminology. Private conversation
with oﬃcials in the China Statistics Bureau revealed that, in 1993, a reform in the statistical criteria
for various variables in this yearbook was attempted and subsequently aborted, hence the inconsistency
of the data. Therefore, in our econometric analysis, for the year of 1993, we use the simple average of
the shares of engineers and technicians in 1992 and 1994.
13E. Share of SOEs
The share of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in an industry can be measured in
several dimensions. It could be the percentage of output, or sales, or employment of
the state-owned enterprises in the industry’s overall ﬁgures. Unexpectedly, data for
calculating the share of SOEs are the most diﬃcult to come by. Publicly available
sources such as the statistical yearbooks contain data mostly at the aggregated levels,
or data collected with changing statistical criteria partly due to the decreasing role of
state ownership. In an earlier version of this paper (Bai, Du, Tao and Tong, 2002),
we constructed a panel data of SOE employment share from the various sources,10 and
found that the resulting SOE employment share had a signiﬁcant drop between 1992 and
1993, which was not easily explained. Private conversation with oﬃcials in the China
Statistics Bureau revealed that more detailed and consistent data on the share of state-
owned enterprises were collected, but they have only been made available to researchers
for internal use. In preparing this version of the paper, we collaborated with researchers
in the Development Research Center of the State Council, People’s Republic of China,
and had access to a set of panel data on the share of SOEs in industrial output (SSOE)
for the 32 industries and over the period of 1985-1997.
3.3 Summary statistics
As described in Section 3.1, Hoover coeﬃcients of localization are calculated using output
data for the 32 two-digit industries over the period of 1985-1997. One way of examining
the Hoover coeﬃcients is to trace the time trend of all industries as a whole. As shown
in Figure 1, the simple average across all industries was 0.313 in 1985. It went down
slightly till 1987 and then rose steadily to 0.343 in 1997. The trend is similar for the
10For 1986-1988, data on SOE employment and COE (collectively-owned enterprises) employment,
and their combined share in the total employment are available from the China Statistical Yearbook.T h e
above data are used to calculate the total employment in an industry. The share of SOE employment,
deﬁned as SOE employment divided by total employment, follows immediately. For 1993-1994, SOE
employment is not provided, but it can be calculated from SOE value added and SOE productivity
(deﬁned as SOE value added divided by SOE employment), both of which are available from the
China Statistical Yearbook. As the total employment in an industry is also available, the share of SOE
employment can be calculated. Finally, for 1988-1992, 1995 and 1997, data on both SOE employment
and total employment are available from, respectively, China Statistical Yearbook, China Industrial
Census,a n dChina Statistical Yearbook on Industrial Economy. Hence the share of SOE employment
can be calculated, in some cases through indirect ways that may have resulted in signiﬁcant inconsistency
in the data.
14weighted average. The weighted (by the output values) average across all industries was
0.256 in 1985. It decreased to 0.250 in 1988 and then increased for all later years to
0.304 in 1997. The aggregate coeﬃcients clearly indicate that, over the 13-year period
of 1985—1997, regional specialization of Chinese industries increased quite substantially.
Our results are in sharp contrast to those in Young (2000) but are consistent with those
in Naughton (1999).
Another way of examining the Hoover coeﬃcients of localization is to compare the
cross-time averages for various industries. As shown in Table 2, there are large variations
in the Hoover coeﬃcients across industries, ranging from 0.146 (metal products) to
0.847 (logging & transport of timber & bamboo). Mining industries, which depend
heavily on resources, are more localized than manufacturing industries: the average
Hoover coeﬃcient for mining industries over the 13-year period is 0.613, while that
for manufacturing is only 0.273.11 Even within manufacturing industries, there exist
signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Tobacco processing is the most localized, followed by cultural,
educational & sports goods, and electronics & telecommunications. Metal products, raw
chemical materials & chemical products, and ordinary machinery & special purposes
equipment are the three least localized industries.
Regarding the measure for the external-economies theory (share of engineers and
technicians) and that for the scale-economies theory (average ﬁrm size), there are also
large variations across industries. Electronics & telecommunications has the highest
share of engineers and technicians (13.99% of the total employment), followed by instru-
ments, meters, cultural & clerical machinery (12.63%), and medical & pharmaceutical
products (10.85%). On the other hand, coal mining & processing has the lowest share
of engineers and technicians (2.73%), with garments & other ﬁber products and textile
having slightly higher shares, 2.85% and 3.22% respectively, of engineers and techni-
cians. Next we examine the variation in average ﬁrm size across industries. Petroleum
& natural gas extraction has the largest ﬁrm size among the industries: RMB5,103,000
per ﬁrm, which is ﬁve standard deviations more than the mean value (RMB216,000 per
ﬁrm). Industries with the second and third largest ﬁrm sizes are tobacco processing
11The ﬁgures are obtained by taking simple averages of the relevant data from Table 2. Mining
industries include industries 6 to 12; manufacturing industries, 13 to 42.
15(RMB687,000 per ﬁrm) and chemical ﬁbers (RMB184,000 per ﬁrm), respectively. The
two industries with the smallest ﬁrm size (RMB6,000 per ﬁrm) are furniture manufac-
turing, and timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm ﬁber & straw products.
Finally, we discuss the variables used for testing the hypotheses on local protec-
tionism, TPM (tax-plus-proﬁt margin) and SSOE (share of state-owned enterprises in
industrial output). As shown in Figure 2, the weighted average of TPMs across all
industries ﬁrst underwent a dramatic decrease from 21.0% in 1985 to 11.6% in 1990, and
then declined gradually to 9.1% in 1997. This is a result of the economic reform that
began in late 1978. Between 1949 and 1978, the Chinese economy was characterized by
a system of central planning. Two important manifestations of central planning were
the lack of competition and the suppression of factor prices, both of which implied high
proﬁt margins for industrial production. The economic reform since 1978, however, has
unleashed forces that have increased product market competition and raised the factor
prices, resulting in lower proﬁt margins for industrial production. The phasing-out of
central planning has made it easier for both local governments and private entrepreneurs
to enter various industries, increasing the competitive pressure in the product market.
Meanwhile, the restrictions on prices of various inputs have gradually been eliminated,
resulting in higher and more volatile market prices, which increase the cost for most
industrial production. The stable proﬁt margins since 1991 signal the maturing of the
competitive markets in China.12 The time trend of the share of state-owned enterprises
in industrial output (namely, SSOE) is shown in Figure 3, and it clearly conﬁrms the
commonly held perception that the state ownership has declined substantially during
the reform era. The cross-industry weighted average of SSOE decreased from 73.11% in
1985 to 68.00% in 1990, and then plunged to 40.92% in 1997.
Besides the clear-cut time trends of TPM and SSOE, Table 2 shows that there are
also signiﬁcant diﬀerences in these variables across industries. The average tax-plus-
proﬁt margin across industries was 13.7%. The industry with the highest TPM was
tobacco processing (56.1%). Electric power, steam & hot water production & supply,
and petroleum reﬁning, coking, & gas production & supply came next, at 22.7% and
19.9% respectively. The industries with the lowest TPMswere coal mining & processing
12Although the discussion here is about proﬁts, tax plus proﬁt should follow the same trend as that
of proﬁts.
16(2.0%), food processing & production (5.9%), and leather, furs, down, & related products
(6.0%). Meanwhile, the average share of SSOE across industries was 57.38%. Industries
with the highest SSOEs were petroleum & natural gas extraction (98.24%), tobacco
processing (97.37%), and logging & transport of timber & bamboo (96.55%), whereas
those with the lowest SSOEs were furniture manufacturing (10.95%), garments & other
ﬁber products (11.73%), and plastic products (19.45%).
4R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s
In this section, we carry out econometric tests of our hypotheses. As discussed in Sec-
tions 3.1 and 3.2, a panel data set for 32 industries and 13 years (1985—1997) has been
constructed for the following variables: Hoover coeﬃcient of localization (HOOVER),
tax-plus-proﬁtm a r g i n( TPM), the share of SOEs (SSOE), average ﬁrm size (SCALE),
and the share of engineers and technicians in industry employment (ET), with the 1986
data of ET missing.
In setting up the model to estimate, we note that the geographical distribution of
the industries may adjust slowly and it may depend on its historical pattern as well as
the factors that we discussed in Section 2. To account for the possible inﬂuence of the
history, we consider the following dynamic panel structure:
HOOVERit = δ1HOOVERi,t−1 + δ2HOOVERi,t−2 + β1TPM it −l
+β2SSOEit + β3SCALEit + β4ETit + αi + εit.
(1)
where αi is the industry-speciﬁce ﬀect, εit is the error term, and l is the years of lag
for variable TPM used in the regression. We consider cases where l =1 , 2,o r3.T h e
reason we use lagged value of TPM is because it takes time for the local government
to identify which industry brings it more tax revenue and therefore is worth protecting.
To maintain suﬃcient sample size, we do not consider lags of more than three years.
The use of the lagged value of TPM also mitigates the potential endogeneity problem
associated with TPM.I f HOOVER and TPM are both endogenously aﬀected by
a common factor and the factor is not controlled for, then TPM is correlated with
17the error term in the regression and the OLS estimate of the equation will be biased.
For example, consider an industry where there is exactly one ﬁrm in every region that
serves local demand for a product that cannot be easily traded across regions. That
industry will have low regional specialization and high proﬁt margin due to its local
monopoly. However, the reason for the low degree of specialization is not because of
local government protection; rather both the low degree of specialization and the high
proﬁt margin are functions of the aforementioned characteristic of the industry. Such an
endogeneity problem disappears with the inclusion of the industry-speciﬁce ﬀects if the
common factor mentioned above is time-invariant. If the common factor is time-variant
but its time-varying component is not auto-correlated, then the use of one-year lag of
TPM together with the industry-speciﬁce ﬀects will solve the endogeneity problem. If
the common factor is time-variant but its time-varying component only has ﬁrst-degree
auto-correlation, then the use of two-year lag of TPM together with the industry speciﬁc
eﬀects will solve the endogeneity problem. Similar arguments can be made for higher-
degree of auto-correlation. If ﬁrst diﬀerencing across time periods is performed to the
equations to eliminate the industry-speciﬁce ﬀects, then longer lag of TPM is needed
to solve the endogeneity problem for a given degree of auto-correlation.
It is not straightforward to estimate equation (1) because the lagged dependent
variable is correlated with the error term εit even if it is assumed that εit is not itself
auto-correlated (Greene, 2000). We use a procedure developed by Arellano and Bond
(1991) to estimate the equation.13 According to the procedure, the industry-speciﬁc
eﬀects are removed by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing equation (1) across time periods. The resulting
equation is then estimated by using the lagged levels of the dependent variable and the
pre-determined variables and the diﬀerence of the exogenous variables as instrumental
variables. We treat the lag values of TPM as pre-determined variables when applying
the Arellano-Bond procedure.
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results of equation (1). In the table, the coeﬃcient
of TPM is always negative regardless of the number of lag years used. It is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level or the 1% level, respectively, when TPM is lagged for one
year or two years. These results strongly support Hypothesis 4 and imply that local
governments have stronger incentives to protect industries that have brought them more
13We thank James E. Rauch for suggesting this procedure to us.
18revenue.
The coeﬃcient of SSOE is always negative regardless of the number of lag years used
for TPM.W h e nTPM is lagged for three year, the coeﬃcient of SSOE is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. These results suggest that local governments have stronger
incentives to protect industries that have a larger share of state-owned enterprises, sup-
porting Hypothesis 5.
The coeﬃcient of SCALE is always positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level regardless of the number of lag years used for the value of TPM. These results
strongly support Hypothesis 2 and imply that there is a higher degree of regional spe-
cialization in industries where the average size of the ﬁr m si sl a r g e r .
The coeﬃcient of ET is also always positive in all cases but is not statistically
signiﬁcant. These results oﬀer weak support to Hypothesis 3 that the degree of regional
specialization is higher in industries with larger shares of engineers and technicians.
The coeﬃcient of the one-year lag value of HOOVER is positive and highly sig-
niﬁcant in all cases. So is the coeﬃcient of its two-year lag value, with lower level of
statistical signiﬁcance. We therefore conclude that the degree of regional specialization
of an industry is strongly inﬂuenced by its history, and that its adjustment in response
to changing characteristics of the industry is slow.
To check the robustness of our results, we estimate some variations of equation (1).
We add one or two lagged values of TPM on the right hand side of equation (1); that
is, we estimate
HOOVERit = δ1HOOVERi,t−1 + δ2HOOVERi,t−2 +
l=l2 P
l=l1
βlTPM it −l
+γ1SSOEit + γ2SCALEit + γ3ETit + αi + εit,
(2)
where l1 =1or 2, l2 =2or 3,a n dl1 6= l2. The estimation results are summarized in
Table 4. The results are remarkably consistent with those in Table 3. The coeﬃcient
o ft h et w o - y e a rl a gv a l u eo fTPM is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in every case.
The coeﬃcient of the one-year lag value is always negative as well even though it is
not statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of the three-year lag is positive in all cases,
however, its magnitude is always dominated by the magnitude of the coeﬃcient of the
two-year lag. The eﬀect of SSOE is always negative and it is also statistically signiﬁcant
19in two of the three cases in the table. The eﬀect of SCALE is always positive and it
is statistically signiﬁcant in all cases. The eﬀect of ET is also always positive but not
statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, the coeﬃcients of the one-year lag and the two-year lag
values of HOOVER are always positive and statistically signiﬁcant.14
We do not include any proxy for immobile resources in our regressions because we
cannot ﬁnd any suitable one for which panel data is available for our sample period. As
the importance of resources declines because of technological advances, their eﬀect on
regional specialization may have become less signiﬁcant. Even if they were still impor-
tant, the lack of a proxy for them in our regressions would not, we believe, compromise
our main conclusion about local protectionism. The reasons are as follows. In China,
resources are mainly controlled by government monopoly. Therefore, one should expect
a positive correlation between resource reliance and the share of state ownership. In fact,
four of the ﬁve highly resource-based industries that we discussed in Section 3.2 have high
shares of industrial output produced by SOEs. According to Table 2, the SSOE ranks
of coal mining & processing, ferrous and nonferrous metals mining & processing, non-
metal minerals mining & processing, petroleum & natural gas extraction, and tobacco
processing industries are 7, 12, 25, 1, and 2, respectively among the 32 industries. One
should also expect a positive correlation between resource reliance and tax-plus-proﬁt
margin. The TPM ranks of the highly resource-based industries are 32, 12, 9, 6, and 1,
respectively, which are relatively high with the exception of the notoriously ineﬃcient
coal mining & processing industry. The positive correlation between resource reliance
and each of the two variables related to local protectionism implies that the missing of
the former in the regression should result in upward biases in the estimated coeﬃcients
of the two protectionism-related variables. Had a proxy for immobile resources been
included, the estimated coeﬃcients of the two protectionism-related variables should be
more negative and our results about local protectionism should become stronger.
In summary, the results from estimating various speciﬁcations of the determinants
of the degree of regional specialization are remarkably consistent. They support our
hypotheses that the degree of regional specialization is lower in industries where the
14We also estimated equations in which only the one-year lag value of HOOVER is included together
with SSOE, SCALE, ET, and the lagged values of TPM, on the right hand side. The results are
consistent with the ﬁndings reported here and are available upon request. However, since the two-year
lag value of HOOVER has statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the regressions we have performed in
this section, there does not seem to be a valid reason to drop it from the equations.
20tax-plus-proﬁt margin and the share of state ownership are higher, suggesting that the
local governments have stronger incentives to protect these industries. They also oﬀer
strong support to the scale-economies theory and weak support to the external-economies
theory of regional specialization.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Although protectionism is an important determinant of trade and specialization, there
has been no systematic empirical study on this issue in the literature. This paper
attempts to ﬁll this void. We construct a panel data of 32 two-digit industries in 29
Chinese regions over a period of 13 years (1985—1997) and use a dynamic panel estimation
method to investigate the determinants of regional specialization in China’s industries,
paying particular attention to local protectionism. We ﬁnd that the degree of regional
specialization is lower for industries with higher proﬁt-plus-tax margins in the past
and for industries with larger shares of state ownership, reﬂecting stronger incentives
for local governments to protect these industries. There are also evidence supporting
the scale-economies theory and, weakly so, the external-economies theory of regional
specialization.
Despite the evidence for the role of local protectionism, the overall time trend of
regional specialization of industrial production in China has reversed an early drop and
registered a signiﬁcant increase in the later years of the reform era. This ﬁnding is in
contrast to that in Young (2000) but is consistent with that in Naughton (1999). Since
our data are more disaggregated than those used by Young (2000) and span a longer and
more recent time period than those used by Naughton (1999), our ﬁnding contributes
to the settling of the debate about the time trend of local protectionism in China.
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24Industry 
Code
Industry Name
Raw Material 
Intensity
13 Food Processing & Production 5.3252
25 Petroleum Refining, Coking, & Gas Production & Supply 3.9547
17 Textile Industry 3.8828
19 Leather, Furs, Down & Related Products 3.5629
30 Plastic Products 3.3184
18 Garments & Other Fiber Products 3.2795
20 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber & Straw Products 3.2598
22 Papermaking & Paper Products 3.2004
41 Electronics & Telecommunications 3.1740
32 Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous & Nonferrous Metals 2.9839
34 Metal Products 2.9658
26 Raw Chemical Materials & Chemical Products 2.9256
37 Transportation Equipment 2.8912
21 Furniture Manufacturing 2.7851
40 Electric Equipment & Machinery 2.7743
24 Cultural, Educational & Sports Goods 2.6981
28 Chemical Fibers 2.6257
23 Printing & Medium Reproduction 2.5793
35 Ordinary Machinery & Special Purposes Equipment 2.5335
29 Rubber Products 2.4215
27 Medical & Pharmaceutical Products 2.2479
44 Electricity Power, Steam & Hot Water Production & Supply 2.0085
31 Nonmetal Mineral Products 1.9918
8 Ferrous & Nonferrous Metals Mining & Processing 1.9464
15 Beverage Production 1.8854
42 Instruments, Meters, Cultural & Clerical Machinery 1.8376
6 Coal Mining & Processing 1.7866
46 Tap Water Production & Supply 1.7219
10 Nonmetal Minerals Mining & Processing 1.3631
7 Petroleum & Natural Gas Extraction 1.2121
16 Tobacco Processing 0.7984
12 Logging & Transport of Timber & Bamboo 0.7494
All 2.6958
Note: Following Kim's measurement, the Raw-Material Intensity is defined as the ratio of (Output-Value added) 
to Value added. Data on both output and value-added are obtained from China Statistical Yearbook on Industrial 
Economy.
Table 1: Raw-Material Intensity for Chinese Industries in 1992Figure 1: Time Trend of Cross-Industry Average Hoover Coefficient of Localization
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Figure 2: Time Trend of Cross-Industry Average Tax-Plus-Profit Margin (%)
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Figure 3: Time Trend of Cross-Industry Average Shares of SOEs (%)
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1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 19976 Coal Mining & Processing 0.579 3 0.0024 15 2.73 32 2.0% 32 79.34 7
7 Petroleum & Natural Gas Extraction 0.744 2 0.5103 1 8.91 7 16.1% 6 98.24 1
8 Ferrous & Nonferrous Metals Mining & Processing 0.578 4 0.0018 19 4.94 18 14.1% 12 66.58 12
10 Nonmetal Minerals Mining & Processing 0.319 12 0.0007 30 4.19 25 15.4% 9 36.13 25
12 Logging & Transport of Timber & Bamboo 0.847 1 0.0040 10 4.38 24 15.0% 11 96.55 3
13 Food Processing & Production 0.199 24 0.0019 18 4.73 19 5.9% 31 68.23 11
15 Beverage Production 0.238 20 0.0018 22 6.31 13 18.8% 5 65.51 14
16 Tobacco Processing 0.537 5 0.0687 2 4.69 20 56.1% 1 97.37 2
17 Textile Industry 0.283 15 0.0047 8 3.22 30 7.4% 29 50.85 21
18 Garments & Other Fiber Products 0.277 17 0.0016 23 2.85 31 7.6% 28 11.73 31
19 Leather, Furs, Down & Related Products 0.279 16 0.0018 20 3.33 29 6.0% 30 22.06 29
20 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber & Straw Products 0.348 10 0.0006 31 4.58 22 7.7% 27 35.95 26
21 Furniture Manufacturing 0.219 22 0.0006 32 3.89 26 8.1% 26 10.95 32
22 Papermaking & Paper Products 0.197 25 0.0018 21 4.50 23 11.0% 20 51.00 19
23 Printing & Medium Reproduction 0.183 27 0.0008 29 3.65 28 13.8% 14 55.30 18
24 Cultural, Educational & Sports Goods 0.476 6 0.0014 24 3.87 27 12.1% 18 26.84 27
25 Petroleum Refining, Coking, & Gas Production & Supply 0.391 8 0.0148 4 10.18 4 19.9% 3 92.47 4
26 Raw Chemical Materials & Chemical Products 0.154 31 0.0036 13 7.96 10 13.1% 15 69.38 9
27 Medical & Pharmaceutical Products 0.159 29 0.0055 7 10.85 3 13.9% 13 69.10 10
28 Chemical Fibers 0.387 9 0.0184 3 6.90 12 15.4% 8 66.29 13
29 Rubber Products 0.192 26 0.0036 12 5.07 17 15.0% 10 56.91 17
30 Plastic Products 0.264 18 0.0014 25 5.96 15 8.8% 25 19.45 30
31 Nonmetal Mineral Products 0.161 28 0.0011 27 4.68 21 12.3% 16 44.47 23
32 Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous & Nonferrous Metals 0.332 11 0.0143 5 6.03 14 15.5% 7 79.05 8
34 Metal Products 0.146 32 0.0012 26 5.96 16 10.0% 24 22.28 28
35 Ordinary Machinery & Special Purposes Equipment 0.154 30 0.0022 16 8.18 9 10.8% 22 58.78 16
37 Transportation Equipment 0.302 14 0.0042 9 9.66 6 10.8% 21 64.68 15
40 Electric Equipment & Machinery 0.229 21 0.0032 14 8.52 8 11.5% 19 39.34 24
41 Electronics & Telecommunications 0.414 7 0.0068 6 13.99 1 10.2% 23 50.72 22
42 Instruments, Meters, Cultural & Clerical Machinery 0.308 13 0.0020 17 12.63 2 12.3% 17 50.88 20
44 Electricity Power, Steam & Hot Water Production & Supply 0.207 23 0.0039 11 9.93 5 22.7% 2 90.02 5
46 Tap Water Production & Supply 0.252 19 0.0008 28 7.21 11 19.8% 4 89.58 6
Mean 0.324 0.0216 6.39 13.7% 57.38
Std. Dev. 0.174 0.0900 2.93 9.0% 25.68
ET
Table 2: Mean Value and Rank of Main Variables
Industry Code Industry name
Unit of measurement: RMB 100,000,000 per firm for SCALE, number per 100 employees for ET, and percentages for TPM and SSOE.
TPM Rank  SSOE   Rank   Rank   HOOVER  Rank  SCALE   Rank Hoover
Lag 1 0.5618 *** 0.5519 *** 0.6388 ***
(0.0981) (0.0935) (0.1)
Lag 2 0.1124 * 0.1356 * 0.1366 *
(0.0678) (0.0711) (0.0773)
TPM
Lag 1 -0.0503 **
(0.024)
Lag 2 -0.0861 ***
(0.0304)
Lag 3 -0.0068
(0.033)
-0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0005 **
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
SCALE 0.1007 *** 0.0986 *** 0.1129 ***
(0.0227) (0.0159) (0.0215)
ET 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005)
CON 0.0010 0.0002 -0.0008
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0009)
# of obs.
Significance test
Wald Chi^2 267.29 508.19
306 306 280
The numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors.
Note: ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significant level, respectively.
Table 3: Estimation of Equation (1)
Dependent variable: Hoover coefficient of localization
123
Explanatory 
Variables
SSOE
310.37Hoover
Lag 1 0.6413 *** 0.5586 *** 0.6377 ***
(0.0995) (0.0963) (0.098)
Lag 2 0.1495 * 0.1286 * 0.1423 *
(0.0776) (0.0707) (0.0779)
TPM
Lag 1 -0.0032 -0.0137
(0.0249) (0.0277)
Lag 2 -0.0808 ** -0.0591 * -0.0856 **
(0.0385) (0.0314) (0.0331)
Lag 3 0.0428 0.0477
(0.0391) (0.0376)
-0.0004 ** -0.0001 -0.0005 **
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
SCALE 0.0700 ** 0.1049 *** 0.0651 **
(0.0319) (0.0232) (0.0296)
ET 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
CON -0.0010 0.0005 -0.0009
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009)
# of obs.
Wald Chi^2
Note: ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significant level, respectively. 
The numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors.
SSOE
Table 4: Estimation of Equation (2)
Explanatory 
Variables
554.68 331.51 446.13
Significance test
306 280 280
Dependent variable: Hoover coefficient of localization
1231985 1986 1987 1988-1989 1990-1994 1995 1996 1997
HOOVER coefficient of locolization (output based)
222 1 1 351
HOOVER coefficient of locolization (employment based)
4N A N A 1 1 N A5 1
SCALE (total output/number of firms/deflator)
111 1 1 311
111 1 1 311
222 2 2 222
TPM (tax-plus-profit margin=(tax+profit)/sales)
111 1 1 311
111 1 1 311
SSOE (share of output produced by state-owned enterprises)
666 6 6 666
666 6 6 666
4 N A 5 5 7 777
4 N A 5 5 7 777
Sales by industry 
Total output by industry
SOE output by industry
Number of engineers and technicians in large & medium 
enterprises by industry
Total employment of large & medium enterprises by industry
Data Appendix: Summary of data and measurement
ET (share of engineers and technicians in employment)
1. China Statistical Yearbook on Industrial Economy 5. China Statistics Bureau
Output by industry by region
Employment by industry by region
Total output by industry
Number of firms by industry
Price deflator
Tax & profit by industry
4. China Industrial Census 1985
2. China Statistical Yearbook 6. Development Research Center, The State Council of PR China
3. China Industrial Census 1995 7. China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 
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